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The Myth Of Free Nuclear Energy PDF Print E-mail

October 21, 2007

The Myth Of Free Nuclear Energy

Prabir Purkayastha
 
THE Congress and its spokespersons have been on overdrive selling a number of myths about the benefits of the India-US Nuclear Deal. Foremost in that has been that of a mythical nuclear bus, which if we do not hop on right now, will leave us in permanent electricity deficit. The bus apparently carries free nuclear energy; all we need to do to tap into this free source of energy is hop on to the bus. In this spin, it is this intransigent Left, stuck in a time warp, which is causing India to miss the bus. The media has been lapping up this vision of free nuclear energy, without any application of either mind or checking up on the facts of nuclear energy. Given the wide-spread credence that the myths about nuclear energy are being given, we are now forced to spend some of our energy on de-constructing these myths.

 THE Congress and its spokespersons have been on overdrive selling a number of myths about the benefits of the India-US Nuclear Deal. Foremost in that has been that of a mythical nuclear bus, which if we do not hop on right now, will leave us in permanent electricity deficit. The bus apparently carries free nuclear energy; all we need to do to tap into this free source of energy is hop on to the bus. In this spin, it is this intransigent Left, stuck in a time warp, which is causing India to miss the bus. The media has been lapping up this vision of free nuclear energy, without any application of either mind or checking up on the facts of nuclear energy. Given the wide-spread credence that the myths about nuclear energy are being given, we are now forced to spend some of our energy on de-constructing these myths.

Myth number 1, the 123 Agreement will give us additional 40,000 MW of nuclear energy: The 123 Agreement does not provide us even one MW of electricity. All that it does is it allows us to import nuclear reactors and uranium fuel from outside. The imported reactors will have to be paid for by us, and therefore setting up of nuclear power plants with imported reactors will be from the total kitty we have for investments. In case we make very large investments in plants with imported reactors, the money will have to be taken out of either our future power sector investments or from other sectors such as infrastructure, health, education, etc. As the Americans say, there is no free lunch. If we want equipment, we will have to pay for it. And as we shall see, importing nuclear reactors is the most expensive way of setting up power plants.

If the 123 Agreement does not provide additional power, what is its significance? India has been under nuclear sanctions since 1974, the first Pokhran explosion. At that time, the sanctions and the ensuing isolation did damage our nuclear energy program quite severely. However, in the last 30 years, we have come a long way and can build nuclear plants completely on our own. Not only can we build nuclear plants with our technology, we can also build it faster than others. The last plant commissioned in the US took 23 years to build. The latest European Union plant being built currently in Finland, has already run up a delay of 18 months in the first 18 months of its construction! Therefore, importing reactors or technology for reactors today is far less important than 30 years back. As we shall see later, the cost of Indian reactors, built with indigenous technology, is also much lower than corresponding western reactors.

Myth number 2, there is a nuclear renaissance in the world and all countries are turning to nuclear energy: The myth of a nuclear renaissance has been created by the nuclear industry. In the 70s and 80s, nuclear industry was building about 20 reactors a year in the US, Western Europe and Japan. Currently, the number of reactors being built in Western Europe, North America and South America is a grand total of 2! If we include Japan also in these countries, the total number goes up to 3. The major growth of nuclear energy is in Asia where countries such as India, China and Korea have seen major growth of the energy sector itself. Where energy needs are growing, nuclear energy is also growing. Even here, the proportion of nuclear energy as a proportion of the total electricity sector is very small. China gets only 1.8 per cent of its electricity from nuclear plants, not very different from that of India. Even if we take the future nuclear plants that China proposes to build, nuclear energy is not going to be more than 5 per cent of its total installed capacity.

It is important to note that out of 223 countries in the world, only 30 have gone in for nuclear power. They have done so after evaluating their energy options and taking decisions based on their energy needs and energy sources available to them. Some, such as Japan and France, have invested heavily in nuclear energy as they sought to be relatively free from the imported sources of energy. For them, it was a case of energy security, as they lacked either coal or oil/gas resources. Countries such as Germany and Sweden are phasing out nuclear plants. UK has yet to decide whether to replace their ageing nuclear plants or phase them out. Therefore, every country turning to nuclear power is nothing but bunkum.
 
The US, which had invested quite heavily in nuclear energy turned xaway from it due to huge overruns in costs and time. “Between 1975 and 1989, the average period required to complete a plant soared from 5 years to 12. The bill for a group of 75 first-generation plants totaled $224.1 billion (in current dollars), 219 per cent more than estimated” (Business Week: Nuclear Power's Missing Fuel, July 10, 2006). Most analysts agree that nuclear plants, given their track record, are unlikely to find favour with investors in the US.

The major hype about this so-called nuclear renaissance has come from the global nuclear industry. This today, is a small club, concentrated in only 4 countries – the US, France, Japan and Russia. If we take the Russians out of this, there are only four major nuclear plant producers – Toshiba owned Westinghouse (US-Japanese), GE-Hitach (US-Japanese), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) and Areva (French). GE and Westinghouse are big players in the global energy market and are also big spenders in campaign contributions to the Republicans. Bush and Cheney are known to be close to the energy lobby and have pushed through a slew of measures to revive the dying nuclear industry in the US. There is up to a half a billion available as subsidy for the first six nuclear plants in the US, apart from numerous other measures such a soft loans and government indemnity against time and cost overruns. Despite that, the first licenses to construct and operate nuclear plants are as much as 5 years away. Jim Rogers, the CEO of Duke Power, one of the companies proposing to build a new nuclear plant in the US expressed his pessimism about Duke’s ability to build this plant. About nuclear renaissance, he said, “I'm not a true believer.... We're talking about a renaissance in nuclear. I don't see it.”

The nuclear industry is building only 3 reactors in their home countries. The prospects of new nuclear plants do not look very bright in any of these countries. That is why they are flogging this story about a nuclear renaissance in India and elsewhere. It is nothing but hype to sell their expensive reactors, which have few takers at home.

Myth number 3, nuclear power is going to be cheaper than coal as it has very low operating costs: There are layers of lies built into this statement. Yes, the operating cost of a nuclear plant is lower than that of coal fired plants. However, the cost of electricity comes not only from the operating cost but also its capital cost. We have to pay for the capital cost of the plants also in the electricity charges we pay as consumers. And for the record, the operating costs of nuclear plants are not as low as the proponents of nuclear power are making them out to be.

CAPITAL COST

 Let us accept the argument that nuclear energy has low operating costs. The question is how much is the capital cost of imported reactor-based nuclear plants? And when we convert these capital costs to the cost that the consumer has to pay per unit of electricity, what will be that cost? The calculations are quite simple. When we build a plant, we put in some money, called equity and borrow the rest. This is called the debt equity ratio. According to Central Electricity Regulatory Commission’s (CERC) norms, the debt equity ratio for thermal plants is 70:30, we need to put in 30 per cent of the total capital cost as equity and are allowed to borrow the rest. As per CERC guidelines, the return on equity allowed which comes out of the tariff the consumer pays is 14 per cent. The loans carry interests, and the interest charges also come out of the tariff. Lastly, there is plant depreciation, which is computed at 3.6 per cent of the plant cost. All these have to be included in calculating the tariff. If we take only these components into account and the cost of the plant as Rs 9 crore per MW (around $2000 per KW) and the accumulated interests during construction, in which period obviously there is no sale of electricity, the total capital cost including this interest is Rs 11.2 crore per MW. The cost of electricity using just the capital cost of the plant alone for imported reactors would be Rs 3.65 per unit as against the cost per unit from coal including the fuel and all other operating costs of Rs 2.20-2.60, depending on their distance from the coal mines. If we take plants at pit heads, the cost committed by Reliance for the Sasan Ultra Mega Power Project is only Rs 1.19. Even after using high cost imported coal, the cost of power from the Mundra Ultra Mega Power project is Rs 2.26!

 If we take indigenous reactors, the capital cost of nuclear plants would be about two thirds of imported reactor based plants. Nuclear power from Indian reactors would cost therefore quite a bit less than that from imported reactors. Even then, it will be somewhat more expensive than that of coal fired plants. However, taking into account the long-term scenario, we need to keep nuclear option alive and should invest some money in nuclear energy, particularly to develop Indian technology further in this area.

OPERATING COST

The operating cost per unit from imported reactors is not as low as the UPA spokespersons are making it out to be. In the case of Kaiga, the operating cost including fuel, heavy water and other operating cost was computed by Nuclear Power Corporation to be Rs 1.48. If we add that to the cost of capital, the cost of electricity becomes Rs 5.13! This is more than twice that from coal fired plants. Therefore, the argument of cheap power from imported nuclear plant is just sheer hogwash.
Recently, the NPC CMD, has claimed that Kudankulam would not be Rs 3.50-3.75 as they had indicated earlier, but will be much lower. However, unless the NPC comes clean on the basis of these calculations, we would consider it to be a statement to justify import of nuclear reactors. Kudankulam was a special case, with Russia agreeing to give us two reactors on soft loans and other concessional terms. If we take the commercial reactors being built abroad, say the Finnish reactor being built by Areva, the French company, its price has already gone to more than $2,500 per KW (Rs 10 crore per MW), well above the figure we have taken above. And we have yet to see the final price of Kudankulam, which we will know only after it finishes construction. All international studies have used $2000 per KW as the base cost of nuclear plants. At these costs, the cost of electricity will be higher than any other source of electricity such as gas, coal or hydro.

Myth number 4, we will run out of coal in 50 years, so we need to build nuclear plants now: This is perhaps the most bogus of all arguments. When geologists calculate mineral reserves, they take into account what the country needs for the next 30 years. If this amount is available as reserves, they then would say we can prospect for more only if we do not have enough for the next 30 years. By this, we have more than adequate reserves of coal.

The fraud that is performed on calculating coal is first to propose that India will need astronomical amount of energy and then argue that since we will run out of coal by 2050, we need to turn to nuclear energy now. First, India has additional billions of tonnes of coal, which are known to be there but not converted to firm reserves, as there is no immediate need. Second, only 50 per cent of the known coal bearing areas have been fully prospected. Third, we are still using very primitive methods for extracting coal, wasting a huge amount of coal reserves. To find more coal reserves or mine more efficiently, requires far less money than buying expensive reactors from Westinghouse and GE!

However, when it comes to uranium fuel, the same people claiming we will run out of coal do not calculate the same way about uranium reserves. If we take the existing uranium reserves, we will run out of these within next 70 years even if we do not add any new nuclear plant. If we double the number of existing nuclear plants, we will run out of uranium in 35 years!

Myth number 5, we need nuclear energy to reduce global warming: India’s position has been that our per capita emissions are one twentieth to one tenth that of developed countries. Therefore, unless they are willing to cap and bring down their emission levels, India will not take binding commitments but will institute only voluntary measures. Recently, Pradipto Ghosh, the former environment secretary has stated that the cost of limiting emissions at this stage would hit Indian economy very hard and could cost us as much as $2.5 trillion. Suddenly, we are making an about turn and are now willing to take the most expensive route for power generation – imported reactors – for reducing greenhouse gases!

Just for the record, even if we put in 40,000 MW of nuclear energy, the reduction of greenhouse gases for not burning that amount of coal will be of the order of 2.5 per cent, that is, by adding this 40,000 MW, we will reduce our emissions by 2.5 per cent only. And this, with an additional cost of Rs 2,20,000 crore that we would require for using the coal fired plants as a route. Using other technologies such as Carbon dioxide sequestration (putting back into the mines the CO2 burnt in the power plants) would be cheaper than using the imported reactor route.

The worst part of the greenhouse gas argument is that the US, which has consistently refused to limit its emissions – it is the sole standout on Kyoto protocols – will now help India reduce its emissions by exporting its expensive reactors for which there are no takers at home.

CONCLUSIONS

The Congress spokespersons have tried to relate the current shortage of power to the slow growth of nuclear energy. The reality is that for the last 17 years, successive governments have starved the power sector of funds, pleading lack of capital. Suddenly, we have so much capital that we are going to choose the most capital expensive route – that of imported reactors – for building new power plants!

To justify the nuclear deal, they have constructed a huge but imaginary shortfall in the year 2031-32, then zeroed in on nuclear energy -- that too with imported reactors -- as the only path to salvation. Once this false future of calamitous shortages is created, it’s that much easier to rush the country into hasty decisions. This is not necessarily a new route; the same one was taken during those bad old Enron days. The recurring image on this route is now a nuclear bus about to leave from some unspecified terminal; if we do not catch this bus today, we will be left in darkness by 2032. The reality is that there is no nuclear bus leaving from anywhere. Nor will we be condemned to darkness in 2032 if we do not to get on board of this mythical bus now.

 

Last Updated on Wednesday, 14 January 2009 08:47
 
Powerless In Summer: The Story Of The Power Sector Reforms PDF Print E-mail

 May 20, 2007
                                                                                                                  
Prabir Purkayastha

INDIA’S power policies are in a quite a bit of mess. It is now clear that we are likely to see large power cuts this year, the impact of which is already visible. After more than 15 years of so-called market based power sector reforms, we now have huge shortages along with high cost of power. If we look at what the Chinese have done in the same period, the contrast could not be clearer. They are installing the equivalent of two Indian grids every five years – they add India’s total installed capacity every two and a half years and have also emerged as the biggest global manufacturers of power plant equipment. Their equipment costs are lower by a whopping 20-40 per cent from that of other manufacturers. No wonder that China, with low cost and abundant power, is emerging as the world’s favourite location for setting up manufacturing facilities, with even Indian companies making a beeline for China.

Let us look at simple figures between India and China’s developments. In the late half of 80s, India was adding about 4,500 MW per year. Starting with an installed capacity of 42,585 MW, we added about 21,400 MW in the Seventh Five Year Plan. In the same period, the Chinese, whose grid was approximately twice ours, were adding about twice what we were – around 9000 MW per year. So the rate of growth of both India and China were quite similar – they had a larger base but both were adding capacity at the same rate. However, the story changes radically if we look at the comparative figures today.

In the last 17 years we have barely reached the capacity addition levels we had in the Seventh Plan. In the Eighth, Ninth Five Year Plans we have added 16,422 MW and 19,095 MW respectively. In the Tenth Plan, we have added another 23,514.5 MW. In the same period, China has increased its installed capacity massively: starting from around capacity additions of 9,000 MW per annum, they are now adding a whopping 50,000 MW per year against our annual additions of around 4,000 MW. While they have accelerated their addition of installed capacity, we have slowed down ours! No wonder today we look only to be a service hub, relying on a good telecommunications network and our human skills. We have given up trying to match China in manufacturing.

Indian Power Scenario: 1985-2007


 March 85
 Mar-90
 Mar-92
 Mar-97
 Mar-02
 March 07
 
Installed Capacity (MW)
 42,585
 63,986
 69,480.50
 85,902.50
 104,917.50
 128,432
 
Added Installed capacity (MW)
 21,401
 5,494.50
 16,422
 19,015
 23,514.5
 
Targeted Capacity Additions (MW)
 
 30,538
(8th Plan)
 40,245.2
(9th Plan)
 41,110.0
(!0th Plan)
 
 
China Power Scenario: 1990-2005

Year
 1990
 1995
 2000
 2005
 
Total Installed capacity (MW)
 135,000
 217,000
 319,317
 490,000
 
Added Installed Capacity (MW)
 
 82,000
 102,317
 170,683
 

THE DIFFERENCE IS IN POLICIES

How did China manage to accelerate its power program while we were slowing down ours? This is directly the result of the kind of policies followed. They decided that if they had a certain amount of money available for investments in the power sector, they had to make that money do more. This meant that cost per MW had to come down if they had to increase installed capacity more rapidly. They settled on two elements for reaching lower cost per MW for their new plants. One was that they ordered their equipment in bulk and therefore could take advantages of economies of scale. If any company places an order for 20 turbines instead of say 2, the price is not 10 times but possibly only 5-7 times. This brought down the costs per every MW added. The second was that they indigenised their power manufacturing rapidly: detailed transfer of technology and manufacturing agreement with Chinese accompanied every bulk order placed on any international company. As a result, not only did they secure equipment at lower costs than any other country, they built the base for their next level of development: they successfully built an equipment manufacturing sector, which produces lowest cost equipment in the world.

If we take the situation in 1980s, India had a stronger equipment manufacturing sector than the Chinese. BHEL had the ability to produce 4,000-5,000 MW power equipment annually. There were no Chinese companies, which could match BHEL in either the range or in the capacity of its manufacture. While BHEL has remained where it was, today, there are three Chinese companies that have the ability to produce 20,000 MW annually. Shanghai Power, Harbin Power and Dongfang are all many times the size of a BHEL.
Not only is China cheaper than India in the international market, even in our home market, Chinese plants cost less than BHEL’s. One can argue on the quality of Chinese plants as Indian manufacturers do. But the fact remains that Chinese plants are working in China with high reliabilities. They also are installing new plants at a rate much faster than any other equipment manufacturers. As we all know, quality comes from mass production: it is the ability to mass produce power plant equipment that is leading to their lower costs and finally their equipment reaching performance standards of other manufacturers.

The above trajectory is not surprising. Before the 90s, India had adopted the same path. We indigenised manufacturing capacity and had standardised our equipment. The result was that BHEL was able to beat all global competition in the Indian market for its equipment. All of NTPC’s global tenders bar one were won by BHEL. With standard unit sizes and an indigenous manufacturing base, all we had to do was to expand the market to lower our costs. This would have meant more plants being installed with the same amount of money and finally cheaper power as one important component of cost of power is obviously the capital cost per MW.

ALBATROSS OF MARKET REFORMS

Instead, the Indian power policy decided to embark on “ambitious” market reforms. There were essentially three elements to this strategy. The first was to invite private capital to invest in new power plants. The second was to reduce public investments in power generation. The third was to use the liquid fuel or hydrocarbon route for power generation, particularly in the west coast. Projects such as Enron bear the hallmark of all these policies.

It is instructive that all the private investors then were asking for power purchase agreements based on capital costs, which were Rs 5 to 6 crore per MW. Even 15 years later, the costs per MW with Chinese technology is not more than Rs 2.5 to 3 crore per MW. Even BHEL plants have capital costs way below figures for such private power plants. BHEL at that time had made an offer to the government that if they are given sufficient orders they could supply plants at Rs 2.5 to 3 crore per MW, an offer that was summarily rejected as not reflecting the market reforms that the government wanted to bring in. And projects such as Enron had naphtha as the fuel as this would mean they could go on-stream quickly. At that time, oil was $10 a barrel. Today, with oil prices at $50-60 a barrel, it has proven preferable for state boards to pay the fixed costs of naphtha-based plants and not draw any power from them.

If we look at how the Indian power sector has treated the indigenous equipment manufacturing sector in terms of policies, the situation is even worse. Not only has the Indian government tried to introduce polices by which BHEL was not helped to acquire technology and also not encouraged to increase its manufacturing capacity, it has actually suffered reverse discrimination in its own domestic market. In the recent open tenders, for Sipat, Barh and Yamunanagar, BHEL has either been disqualified for not having technology for supercritical boilers or has been priced out by cheaper Chinese or Korean equipment. Here, not having a plan for importing or developing technology of supercritical boilers before opening out the market, as well as no import duties on finished equipment are responsible for BHEL losing out.

PENALISING BHEL

The current duty structure is a completely inverted one as semi-finished or raw materials are taxed but finished goods are not. Thus there are no import duties for power plants above a certain size –– in the name of super thermal power stations, all duties are waived for plants of 1000 MW and above size. This obviously penalises BHEL as they have to pay high duties for intermediate or primary raw materials while the finished goods comes without any duties. Instead of helping indigenous manufacture, we are now entering a phase where it is the foreign companies that the government wants to help. The long-term threat to the power sector is once indigenous manufacturers such as BHEL are priced out in the domestic market, the prices can then go up without hindrance.

We have written earlier that all countries help their domestic industry, while preaching the virtues of “free market”. It requires a particular kind of stupidity to believe these self serving slogans to open out the Indian market and not use it as the Chinese have done to improve its market position. The irony is that while Indian equipment manufacturing industry has missed a golden opportunity to upgrade their technology leveraging on the size of the Indian market, those countries preaching the virtues have not gained either. The market is clearly now with Chinese, Koreans and the Russians, with BHEL playing second fiddle. Companies such as Alstom, ABB, Siemens and other such companies seem to be on the way out. They may still be around for some more time. But with no domestic market after 2012 in Europe and the US, their days seem to be numbered. Unfortunately, with the policies being followed currently, BHEL may not be far behind.

Indian power sector reforms need a critical re-examination. However, the government is unwilling to do this exercise, mired as it is in its chase for market driven reforms. With such faith in the market, there is no short-term hope for the power sector. The only hope is that sooner rather than later, the government will wake up to the simple fact that the power reforms are not working. That is the time we can try and salvage what remains of the sector.

Last Updated on Wednesday, 14 January 2009 08:48
 
The Ultra Mega Power Project Manoeuvre PDF Print E-mail

Backdoor Entry Of Failed Privatisation

Prabir Purkayastha
 
THE power scene is becoming curios and curioser. Just as the power privatisation dreams of the government has foundered on the cruel rock of reality – with the Orissa Regulator cancelling the private distribution company’s licenses – the power ministry is busy smuggling even more privatisation under the guise of “ultra mega” power projects. The terms and conditions of the ultra mega power projects demand that any state taking power from ultra mega projects will be forced to privatise distribution of electricity for all towns with population of more than 1 million! All this is being done secretively, with this clause remaining secret in all the documents regarding ultra mega projects.

The privatisation of electricity started with Orissa “reforms”, more as a consequence of the Orissa government taking a $450 million World Bank loan in which this was a pre-condition. As per this agreement, the Board’s activities were split in three and "unbundled" –– distribution, transmission and generation were made into independent activities. An "independent" State Regulatory Authority was formed. The distribution side was hived off to form four Regional Distribution Companies (Distcos), while the transmission side was constituted as a State Power Grid Corporation (Gridco). Apart from Gridco and Orissa Hydel Power Corporation, all other entities were privatised. The four distribution companies were privatised in 1999 by transferring 51 per cent of the share of these companies to private companies. Three of them were taken over by BSES (now Reliance Energy), while the fourth (CESCO) was transferred to AES Corporation of US who was also the 49 per cent owners of OPGC generating plant. Soon after the privatisation of distribution, AES decided to run away and the Orissa government had to take over AES.

DISMAL RECORD

The record of the privatised companies make dismal recording. A high level committee was set up after the collapse of CESCO and the withdrawal of AES headed by Sovan Kunango, IAS (Retd). The Kunango Committee Report, submitted in October 2001, was a damming indictment of both the privatisation process and the private companies. Undeterred by any of this, the power ministry, both under the earlier NDA and now the UPA government, has been unabashed votary of privatisation as the only panacea for the power sector. The Delhi privatisation was the result of this mindset and it is not surprising that it is also running into equally rough weather.

The Orissa Regulatory Commission had taken up various issues with Reliance Energy. Most of it was that Reliance was unwilling to commit any finances to the Distco’s and was also not paying Gridco’s bill. Gridco’s outstanding as of June 30, 2005 was an astronomical Rs 1,814 crore! In other words, it was Gridco and the state of Orissa that was bankrolling Reliance Energy. Instead of private sector taking over state’s liabilities, in reality it was the state underwriting the private sector’s liabilities. After numerous notices and orders, the Orissa regulator finally ran out of patience. In an order dated January 27, 2006, they cancelled Reliance Energy’s licenses. Of course, Reliance has appealed to the Electricity Tribunal, where the matter is being heard. But the brutal fact that the power ministry needs to accept is that their neo-liberal vision of booming private power and a sick state sector has completely failed.

The state sector went into a crisis after 50 years, particularly after 1991 when the government decided it had to be made sick. The private sector seems to have achieved this in a scant matter of five years. With Orissa showing the way, Delhi may not be far behind. Already, the Delhi citizens have given notice they will not take lying down the continuous raising of electricity prices while the power cuts increase and reliability worsens. The cosy relationship between the Delhi government, the Regulator and the private companies will come under tension as Delhi citizens increasingly show their ire. Therefore, to again hawk the discredited privatisation of distribution under the guise of mega power projects makes very little sense today.

REAL GAMEPLAN

How did this coupling of privatisation of distribution and ultra mega power projects take place? This started in 1999 when Rangarajan Kumaramangalam mooted the concept of mega power projects. The power ministry had then proposed that in order to draw power from the mega power project, the states would have to agree to privatise their distribution. This notification was a part of the larger privatisation drive then. However, with the collapse of the mega power projects, nobody had paid any attention to this provision of mega power projects. However, when ultra mega power projects were mooted, this provision is now being used as a backdoor entry for the discredited privatisation measures that have already failed in Orissa and in Delhi.

Already, Southern Regional Board and other SEBs have protested to the ministry that there is no logic of putting forward a condition of privatisation of distribution when the scheme of mega power projects is for generation. As the Southern Board stated that such a linkage does not help in quick mega capacity additions and will only impede addition of generation. They had argued that if granting of mega power projects depends on this pre-condition, then the projects in which state entities are partners, such as TNEB for Ennore etc., will not get mega project status and it will hamper their efforts to add to generation.

The ministry’s response gives the game away: the cabinet has approved of these conditions in order to get the confidence of the financial institutions and project developers. Interestingly enough, the project developers are not even aware of this specific condition: it does not figure in the Power Finance Corporation (PFC) website or in any of the PFC documents. As the focal point of the ultra mega projects is the PFC, who neither knows nor has included this in their terms of reference for the projects, this condition is not coming from the developers. Unless there are secret confabulations going on between developers and the power ministry. So the only party that could impose such conditions are the financial institutions such as World Bank, ADB, etc.

It is difficult to believe that the government is following such a policy at the behest of the financial institutions; India is not a small country that is forced to do what the FI’s tell it so. It appears that having failed in its attempts to force the states to undertake privatisation, the centre is now taking a different tack. After all, power sector is a joint sector under the constitution and therefore the centre cannot force the states to do what they do not want. The attempt therefore was first to deny them funds for their power programs if they did not accept privatisation. Having failed there, they now want to deny states additional power coming from the mega and ultra mega projects unless they accept the privatisation of distribution. We understand that some states have signed similar agreements for power from projects such as Sipat. It will be interesting to also check that whether Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and others states which are proposing to host the ultra mega projects have signed similar agreements. It will be particularly interesting if Orissa again agrees to privatise its distribution so promptly after the failure of its current privatisation experiment.

BLACKMAILING THE STATES

The other part of the mega power project (or ultra mega project) schemes is that they are sought to be done almost exclusively as central-private partnership and keeping out the states. The states will slowly have the distribution and transmission side of the sector with the centre emerging as one large Independent Power Producer.  Already NTPC plays this role. The net result is that while the states are sinking deeper and deeper into crisis, NTPC is making hefty profits: it has made more than Rs 5,000 crore profits this year also. If the ultra mega projects comes up within this kind of architecture, the states will become even more dependent on the centre and will be forced to accept whatever diktat that the centre hands out. Including privatisation of distribution.

The proposal of privatisation of distribution as suggested by the centre under the mega power scheme has another even more perverse side. Earlier, the loss making rural areas were sought to be clubbed with the profit making urban sector so as to have a balance. The current scheme proposed under the mega power project guise destroys even this slender balance.

This attempt to smuggle in privatisation of distribution not only smacks of a bad policy as already shown in Orissa and Delhi but also a dishonest one. No such policy, which affects all people in this country, should be conducted in such secrecy. The government must first put this issue to a public debate before trying to blackmail the states with ultra mega projects. 

The problem with the power sector has always been that the centre has no responsibility for actually providing electricity. So it is easy for it lay down the law to the states as to how this sector should be run. With the centre emerging also as a major IPP, its vision is even more blinkered: that of a generator. This lack of vision is coupled with the neo-liberal fundamentalism within the highest levels of the government, which believes that everything that shines is private. If the NDA paid a heavy price for its belief of a shining private India being synonymous with a shining India, the UPA is not going to be forgiven either.

Last Updated on Wednesday, 14 January 2009 08:49
 
The Ultra Mega Power Project Manoeuvre: Backdoor Entry Of Failed Privatisation By Prabir Purkayastha PDF Print E-mail

THE power scene is becoming curios and curioser. Just as the power privatisation dreams of the government has foundered on the cruel rock of reality – with the Orissa Regulator cancelling the private distribution company’s licenses – the power ministry is busy smuggling even more privatisation under the guise of “ultra mega” power projects. The terms and conditions of the ultra mega power projects demand that any state taking power from ultra mega projects will be forced to privatise distribution of electricity for all towns with population of more than 1 million! All this is being done secretively, with this clause remaining secret in all the documents regarding ultra mega projects.

The privatisation of electricity started with Orissa “reforms”, more as a consequence of the Orissa government taking a $450 million World Bank loan in which this was a pre-condition. As per this agreement, the Board’s activities were split in three and "unbundled" –– distribution, transmission and generation were made into independent activities. An "independent" State Regulatory Authority was formed. The distribution side was hived off to form four Regional Distribution Companies (Distcos), while the transmission side was constituted as a State Power Grid Corporation (Gridco). Apart from Gridco and Orissa Hydel Power Corporation, all other entities were privatised. The four distribution companies were privatised in 1999 by transferring 51 per cent of the share of these companies to private companies. Three of them were taken over by BSES (now Reliance Energy), while the fourth (CESCO) was transferred to AES Corporation of US who was also the 49 per cent owners of OPGC generating plant. Soon after the privatisation of distribution, AES decided to run away and the Orissa government had to take over AES.

DISMAL RECORD

The record of the privatised companies make dismal recording. A high level committee was set up after the collapse of CESCO and the withdrawal of AES headed by Sovan Kunango, IAS (Retd). The Kunango Committee Report, submitted in October 2001, was a damming indictment of both the privatisation process and the private companies. Undeterred by any of this, the power ministry, both under the earlier NDA and now the UPA government, has been unabashed votary of privatisation as the only panacea for the power sector. The Delhi privatisation was the result of this mindset and it is not surprising that it is also running into equally rough weather.

The Orissa Regulatory Commission had taken up various issues with Reliance Energy. Most of it was that Reliance was unwilling to commit any finances to the Distco’s and was also not paying Gridco’s bill. Gridco’s outstanding as of June 30, 2005 was an astronomical Rs 1,814 crore! In other words, it was Gridco and the state of Orissa that was bankrolling Reliance Energy. Instead of private sector taking over state’s liabilities, in reality it was the state underwriting the private sector’s liabilities. After numerous notices and orders, the Orissa regulator finally ran out of patience. In an order dated January 27, 2006, they cancelled Reliance Energy’s licenses. Of course, Reliance has appealed to the Electricity Tribunal, where the matter is being heard. But the brutal fact that the power ministry needs to accept is that their neo-liberal vision of booming private power and a sick state sector has completely failed.

The state sector went into a crisis after 50 years, particularly after 1991 when the government decided it had to be made sick. The private sector seems to have achieved this in a scant matter of five years. With Orissa showing the way, Delhi may not be far behind. Already, the Delhi citizens have given notice they will not take lying down the continuous raising of electricity prices while the power cuts increase and reliability worsens. The cosy relationship between the Delhi government, the Regulator and the private companies will come under tension as Delhi citizens increasingly show their ire. Therefore, to again hawk the discredited privatisation of distribution under the guise of mega power projects makes very little sense today.

REAL GAMEPLAN

How did this coupling of privatisation of distribution and ultra mega power projects take place? This started in 1999 when Rangarajan Kumaramangalam mooted the concept of mega power projects. The power ministry had then proposed that in order to draw power from the mega power project, the states would have to agree to privatise their distribution. This notification was a part of the larger privatisation drive then. However, with the collapse of the mega power projects, nobody had paid any attention to this provision of mega power projects. However, when ultra mega power projects were mooted, this provision is now being used as a backdoor entry for the discredited privatisation measures that have already failed in Orissa and in Delhi.

Already, Southern Regional Board and other SEBs have protested to the ministry that there is no logic of putting forward a condition of privatisation of distribution when the scheme of mega power projects is for generation. As the Southern Board stated that such a linkage does not help in quick mega capacity additions and will only impede addition of generation. They had argued that if granting of mega power projects depends on this pre-condition, then the projects in which state entities are partners, such as TNEB for Ennore etc., will not get mega project status and it will hamper their efforts to add to generation.

The ministry’s response gives the game away: the cabinet has approved of these conditions in order to get the confidence of the financial institutions and project developers. Interestingly enough, the project developers are not even aware of this specific condition: it does not figure in the Power Finance Corporation (PFC) website or in any of the PFC documents. As the focal point of the ultra mega projects is the PFC, who neither knows nor has included this in their terms of reference for the projects, this condition is not coming from the developers. Unless there are secret confabulations going on between developers and the power ministry. So the only party that could impose such conditions are the financial institutions such as World Bank, ADB, etc.

It is difficult to believe that the government is following such a policy at the behest of the financial institutions; India is not a small country that is forced to do what the FI’s tell it so. It appears that having failed in its attempts to force the states to undertake privatisation, the centre is now taking a different tack. After all, power sector is a joint sector under the constitution and therefore the centre cannot force the states to do what they do not want. The attempt therefore was first to deny them funds for their power programs if they did not accept privatisation. Having failed there, they now want to deny states additional power coming from the mega and ultra mega projects unless they accept the privatisation of distribution. We understand that some states have signed similar agreements for power from projects such as Sipat. It will be interesting to also check that whether Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and others states which are proposing to host the ultra mega projects have signed similar agreements. It will be particularly interesting if Orissa again agrees to privatise its distribution so promptly after the failure of its current privatisation experiment.

BLACKMAILING THE STATES

The other part of the mega power project (or ultra mega project) schemes is that they are sought to be done almost exclusively as central-private partnership and keeping out the states. The states will slowly have the distribution and transmission side of the sector with the centre emerging as one large Independent Power Producer.  Already NTPC plays this role. The net result is that while the states are sinking deeper and deeper into crisis, NTPC is making hefty profits: it has made more than Rs 5,000 crore profits this year also. If the ultra mega projects comes up within this kind of architecture, the states will become even more dependent on the centre and will be forced to accept whatever diktat that the centre hands out. Including privatisation of distribution

The proposal of privatisation of distribution as suggested by the centre under the mega power scheme has another even more perverse side. Earlier, the loss making rural areas were sought to be clubbed with the profit making urban sector so as to have a balance. The current scheme proposed under the mega power project guise destroys even this slender balance.

This attempt to smuggle in privatisation of distribution not only smacks of a bad policy as already shown in Orissa and Delhi but also a dishonest one. No such policy, which affects all people in this country, should be conducted in such secrecy. The government must first put this issue to a public debate before trying to blackmail the states with ultra mega projects. 

The problem with the power sector has always been that the centre has no responsibility for actually providing electricity. So it is easy for it lay down the law to the states as to how this sector should be run. With the centre emerging also as a major IPP, its vision is even more blinkered: that of a generator. This lack of vision is coupled with the neo-liberal fundamentalism within the highest levels of the government, which believes that everything that shines is private. If the NDA paid a heavy price for its belief of a shining private India being synonymous with a shining India, the UPA is not going to be forgiven either.

 
The only Choice: Subsidise or Nationalise Enron By Prabir Purkayastha PDF Print E-mail

As critics of Enron, we owe an apology to the nation for failing to bring out the true nature of the Enron contract. Instead of Dhabol power costing Rs.4.00 and being a bad deal as we claimed, it is costing Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) more than Rs.7.00 and is a singular disaster for both MSEB and the Maharashtra Government. The average cost of power from MSEB’s own generation is in the range of Rs.2.00, and the cost of purchased power from NTPC, Bombay Suburban, Tata Electric, etc., varying from Rs.0.80 to Rs.3.00. For the first phase of 748 MW alone, MSEB is suffering a loss of more than Rs.700 crore per year due to costly Enron power, paying Enron 15% of its revenue for a measly 5% of its requirement.

Once the second stage of Enron comes on-stream next year, according to the studies done by Prayas, a group of young energy professionals, MSEB will have to pay Enron 52% of its current revenue and suffer a net loss of more than Rs.3,000 crore per year. Not only will MSEB collapse due to this huge outflow, so will the Maharashtra Government. The tariffs will have to more than double for meeting these outflows, leading to large-scale unrest. The only way that Maharashtra can pay is by handing over to Enron MSEB’s assets in bits and pieces. This is what UPSEB is doing to settle NTPC’s outstanding dues. In other words, to pay for power from a 2,192 MW power station, Maharashtra will have to hand over its 10,000 MW generating and other assets in the next five years.

What was wrong with the Enron contract? Was it just a case of bad contract by stupid Maharashtra and Central Governments? Successive Governments in both the state and the centre have pushed the Enron project and have given guarantees and counter guarantees. The 13-day Government of Vajpayee in its miniscule tenure in 1996 did only one thing of note: it gave Enron the counter guarantee without which it could not have reached a financial closure for the project. The Pawar-Salve power purchase agreements (PPA) or the Thakeray-Munde PPA both have identical features that have brought the Maharashtra Government to its current pass. If we overlook either stupidity or chicanery, there were three major mistakes in the Enron contract. First was to peg the cost of power against the dollar: if Coca Cola or Pepsi can sell colas in India in rupees, so can Enron. The second was to accept the hydrocarbon route – naphtha and LNG as the fuels for Dhabol and link our energy prices to the volatile international prices of oil. The third was to guarantee minimum off-take for paying fixed costs. These three factors taken together have ensured that Enron power today is three times MSEB’s average cost of power generation and more than twice the most expensive power produced in the state. Worse, it is likely to rise every year as the rupee continues to depreciate against the dollar.

Maharashtra Government’s plea that the centre should take over a part of its Enron liabilities is a plea that the entire country should now bail out the Maharashtra Government. If the centre lifts this power, it will have to sell it to other states at a subsidised rate. Enron’s argument that it should be allowed to trade power with other states is a spurious one, as no state will buy Enron power at these prices. What Enron and the Maharashtra Government is asking is that the centre, which has refused till now to subsidise power for agriculture, should instead subsidise Enron.

At that time the Enron deal was originally signed, Enron and its defenders claimed a tariff of Rs. 2.40 per unit, which certainly did not seem as frightening as the current figure of Rs.7.20 given by the Maharashtra power minister, Padamsinh Patil. The first stage of the Enron deal – of 748 MW -- was signed under the aegis of Sharad Pawar, the then Chief minister of Maharashtra and N.K.P.Salve, the Union Minister for Power. The BJP and Shiv Sena joined in the anti-Enron movement that erupted in Maharashtra then and even cancelled their contract after coming to power. However, after high level lobbying by Enron including crucial meetings with the Bal Thackery, the remote controller of Shiv Sena, and Gopinath Munde, the BJP Deputy Chief Minister, not only was the first stage restored in 1996 but Enron was rewarded by an even bigger second stage of 1444 MW. Though the Shiv Sena-BJP Government claimed that the cost per unit had been lowered to Rs.1.86, the reality was that the cost reduction was “achieved” by taking a lower value of the dollar against the rupee prevailing then and various other fudges. Worse, the Shiv Sena-BJP Government gave various undertakings to Enron, effectively immunising their contract from future legal challenges. Instead of dropping Enron in the Arabian Sea as promised before they assumed power, the Shiv Sena-BJP Government seemed to have done this service for MSEB.

When the second stage comes on-stream, the cost of electricity will drop somewhat as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is a cheaper fuel than naphtha being used currently. The catch here is that LNG contracts are take-or-pay contracts; irrespective of whether you lift LNG or not, you still have to pay for it. Currently, as the cost of Enron power is very high, MSEB has been paying fixed costs to Enron and not drawing more than 40% of its power as the variable cost of Enron power was higher than the cost of power including fixed and variable costs from other sources. However, this option will not be open in the second stage. MSEB will have to pay both fixed costs and fuel charges up to 82% of Enron’s capacity. In the first year alone, Enron’s annual power bill will be a whopping Rs.6,500 crore against MSEB’s current revenue base of Rs.12,500 crore.

The real issue that needs to be addressed is what can the people of Maharashtra now do after the earlier Congress and the Shiv Sena-BJP Government have delivered them tied hand and foot to Enron? Whatever possibilities that existed in terms of modifying the contract seems to have been killed after the second stage was renegotiated by the Shiv Sena-BJP Government. Thus, scrapping the contract is not going to be easy. Challenging the deal on grounds of corruption in the Supreme Court where the CITU case is still pending, is not easy as the courts generally ask for proof of corruption. This is not easy to furnish even with the full resources of the state let alone for organisations outside the system.

The only recourse that exists today is for nationalising Enron and paying them compensation based on what should have been a just contract and not the bloated one we have struck. This will go against the grain of the current theology -- liberalisation and privatisation -- of the Government. People will argue that a contract is sacrosanct and cannot be aborted. For them, I will like to point out the telecom imbroglio. When the telecom companies argued that their contracts were unworkable, the Government changed the terms of the contract to bail them out. If the contracts were not sacrosanct then, how is it that they are sacrosanct now when the people of Maharashtra have to be bailed out?

 
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